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One of the tasks of the humanities academic—the philosopher, the cultural studies
researcher—is to devise informed judgement through the exercise of a complex intelligence.
It’s a matter, one might think, of sorting out the truth from bullshit and telling it how it is.
If only the world would just stay simple … This directness has some appeal, until you
start trying to specify the appropriate criteria, grounding and form for judgement. Disciplines
address precisely these issues, and to the extent to which they do so successfully, they spec-
ify complex phenomena in particular ways; they authorise certain kinds of enquiry and
speech as they productively cultivate their own patch of knowledge. Cultural studies has
made interdisciplinarity its business, bewitched and distracted by the complexities of
actual existing cultural practices, by spatial and temporal mobility and seepage, by authority
and exclusion, ownership, belonging and boundaries.
The philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers gives us a tag for this issue as she crosses the
humanities–sciences divide and asks what procedures distinguish true scientists from char-
latans, dwelling on the case of Franz Mesmer in the late eighteenth century. Medical science,
in particular, has had a hard time shaking off quasi-scientific ‘healers’ whose success seems
unaccountable. Medicine itself remains full of mystery, and Stengers challenges sciences in
general to embrace the risks of innovative experiment and collective responsibility.
A variety of historical engagements and explorations in historicity provide material for
our other essays. The mania for historical re-enactment, ‘lived’ history, is explored by Simone
Bignall and Mark Galliford through a study of the replication of the Duyfken, the ship from
whose decks Cape York was sighted by Europeans on the first recorded occasion in 1606.
They show how the replication of history is a detailed business that has much to do with
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from evolving towards a situation where they are statistically compensated by opposite
processes. From the point of view of the definition of the system—that is, the definition of
the processes for which it is the base, the interactions that characterise it, and therefore the
mathematical equations that describe it—it did not seem that non-equilibrium should be
able to contribute anything new at all. This is why, incidentally, physical chemistry remained
for a long time centred on the study of systems in equilibrium, by far the more simple.
Today we know that this is no longer the case. Far from equilibrium, certain physico-
chemical systems are likely to adopt a new kind of behaviour, the behaviour that Ilya Prigogine
has called ‘dissipative structures’.
Dissipative structure was introduced into the heart of physics as a concept that, until then,
had belonged exclusively to biology or to political thought: the concept of ‘self-organisation’.
I will limit myself here to highlighting that physico-chemical self-organisation indicates first
and foremost a transformation in the type of causality on the basis of which it is possible
to describe the entropy-producing macroscopic activity of a physico-chemical system. In
equilibrium, or in regimes approaching it, it is possible to assert that the dissipative activity
of a system is entirely determined by its relations with the environment: it is nil in equili-
brium, and it corresponds, in a near-to-equilibrium state, to a minimum compatible with
the exchanges, and is therefore deducible from these exchanges. On the other hand, the acti-
vity of dissipative structures can no longer be defined as deducible from the exchanges with
the environment that are nevertheless its necessary condition. In other words, the ‘control
variables’ that describe the exchanges with the environment, here lose their status of suffi-
cient and necessary determinants, in order to become constraints that make an activity possi-
ble. It is in this sense that this activity could be called ‘self-organised’.
The very identity of the system can be transformed in another way: factors insignificant
to equilibrium, such as the existence of a gravitational field, can come to play a crucial role
when one is far from equilibrium, that is, they render the ‘system’ capable of differentiated
but coherent regimes of activity. So, without gravitation, whose influence can be negligible
when a layer of liquid is in equilibrium, the spectacular Bénard cells do not form in this liquid
layer when it is heated from beneath. Far from equilibrium, gravitation is not simply a
synonym of ‘weight’, acting in the same manner on each molecule, it makes possible quali-
tatively new collective behaviours.
The sensitivity of a system far from equilibrium to factors that were insignificant, or
negligible in equilibrium, is a very important conceptual discovery. In effect it means that
whatever has the status of cause, which should intervene in the description and the pre-
diction of a behaviour, is not given once and for all. It is the very activity of the system, which
here determines what will, for it, have the status of a cause and how this cause will cause.
Physical chemists had the habit of deducing the possible behaviours of a system on the basis
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cultures of the present. Sara Wills and Kate Darian-Smith, on the other hand, move from
cultures of the present to the past as they turn a quasi-ethnographic gaze onto the Frankston
festival celebrating a Britishness that is fading, and perhaps distorting, memories and identity.
Cross-cultural work of a different kind is demonstrated by Minoru Hokari and Alison
Lewis, both of whom are concerned with historical imagination and the nation-state. Hokari,
who has done historical fieldwork in Gurindji country, here attempts to use reflections on
his subjectivity as a Japanese researcher to break open old debates between black and white
in Australia and re-locate reconciliation issues, at last, in a more global register. Lewis reports
a recent bout in Germany’s disputative memory culture.
In an outstanding ‘New Writing’ section, Linda Neil offers a stunning piece of family
memory-work and John Kinsella performs poetically a reflection on ‘A Loss of Poetics’. Finally,
among many excellent reviews, is another piece that engages our theme: who indeed are the
charlatans in the debate about Indigenous history that Keith Windschuttle has whipped up?
Taking a fresh and challenging approach, Klaus Neumann asks just why it is that historical
debate is so often, in historical circles, content to dwell on the past, deploying a regime of
truth that can only imply, and not fully discuss, questions of culture: as if what we think
about Indigenous presence (or absence) in our conception of the nation is only a question
of facts and has nothing to do with the constant work of the plastic arts that are Australian
identities.
Two things to look out for with our next issue: we will be launching a new section, ‘Pro-
vocations’, where we’ll feature excitations, debates and disputations; and we’re shifting
our publishing schedule so that, from 2004, we’ll appear in March and September.
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avoid the artefact if the laboratory must eliminate, in order to give the scientist the power to
ask his own questions, the counter-power constituted by ‘interpretation’, whether conscious
or not, coming to them from the beings interrogated?
Apparently, the meanings that a micro-organism gives to its environment are stable enough
so that experimental interrogation does not, in its case, create mere artefacts of the situation.
This is why Pasteur was able to study the question of the ‘field’ (test-tube or living body)
from the point of view of its germs. But the almost paranoid precautions to ensure the repro-
ducibility of experiments in the case of experimental psychology are witness to the fact that,
even for rats and pigeons, the experimental mise en scène creates an ‘artefact’. In effect it cre-
ates observable variables (how many times does a rat swim in a Porsolt tank before going
under?) for which the first significance is to set oneself up against what one is supposed to
be studying. Whatever definition we might think of giving to the ‘mind’ of a rat, one thing
is sure: the art of experimental proof carried out in laboratories, where ‘animal models’ are
used to test ‘medications’ aiming to modify human psychic behaviour, does not take this
mind into account, but actively denies the problem of its existence.
But in speaking of practical contradictions, isn’t one attributing to the ‘mind’ of a rat, or
that of the patient, something of a spiritual capacity to create their own meanings? Why aban-
don the hope for a future where this capacity would itself become one of many variables,
at the very least because it keeps in the background the good old opposition between material
at hand and the free spirit of inquiry. It is because of this type of objection that it is not
useless to consider the example given today by the sciences in which experimental procedure
has dominated. It is not a question of looking among these sciences for a ‘point of view’ for
imagination, suffering, interpretation or suggestion. Contemporary physics or chemistry do
not offer us interpretative resources. They authorise the simple statement that there is nothing
mysterious or spiritualist in supposing that a living body may not satisfy experimental require-
ments. That there is nothing surprising in encountering ‘causes’ that can be identified as vari-
ables, which one can identify and put into play as one pleases. In fact, the exploration of the
qualitative difference between, on the one hand, systems that function in equilibrium, or
close to it, and those, on the other, whose relationships with their environment keep them
far from equilibrium allows us to conclude that it is in exceptional situations where one can
separate a cause from its effects in a general and reproducible manner.
Apparently the difference between these two situations, in equilibrium and way out of
equilibrium, is purely quantitative and certainly without mystery. In a state of equilibrium,
the exchanges between a system and its environment are either nil or balanced, as is the case,
for example, when a glass of water is in thermal equilibrium with the room it is in. Main-
taining something out of equilibrium simply means that the exchanges with the environ-
ment carry out certain processes for which the system is the base. It stops them therefore
